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ABSTRACT 
Security decision-making is a critical task in tackling security threats affecting a 
system or process. It often involves selecting a suitable resolution action to tackle 
an identified security risk. To support this selection process, decision-makers 
should be able to evaluate and compare available decision options. This article 
introduces a modelling language that can be used to represent the effects of 
resolution actions on the stakeholders' goals, the crime process, and the attacker. 
In order to reach this aim, we develop a multidisciplinary framework that 
combines existing knowledge from the fields of software engineering, crime 
science, risk assessment, and quantitative decision analysis. The framework is 
illustrated through an application to a case of identity theft. 
Keywords: security; requirements engineering; decision-making; risk; crime 
script; uncertainty; identity theft 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Security decision-making often involves choosing amongst different alternatives 
to tackle a security problem. This is a complex activity encountered in the 
production and maintenance of any system comprising valuable assets. It appears 
at different stages of a system's life cycle, from early requirements analysis to 
system design, through implementation and maintenance. In all of these stages 
there may be different alternatives available, each with pros and cons from a 
security perspective. Although it has been accepted that we could never have a 
completely secure system [3], the security of a system can generally be improved, 
with quality improvement resulting from better decisions.  
Decision-making is a problem encountered in different fields. Various studies 
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have been conducted to tackle it, often focusing on representation and 
management of uncertainty. Saaty introduced the Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) for decision-making, which focuses on the important factors that are 
needed to improve decision-making [4]. Moore, Kazman, Klein, and Asundi 
introduced a Cost Benefit Analysis Method (CBAM), which involves estimating 
the value of architectural strategies to support the decision-making process [5]. 
Letier, Stefan, and Barr argued that modelling uncertainty and mathematically 
analysing its consequences lead to better decisions than either hiding uncertainty 
behind point-based estimates or treating uncertainty qualitatively as an inherently 
uncontrollable aspect of software development [6]. Veerappa and Letier 
addressed a gap in understanding variations between solutions in the design space 
to support decision-makers [7]. Mylopoulos, Chung, Liao, Wang, and Yu 
contributed to the development of concepts, and modelling techniques for the 
evaluation of alternative system options in the heart of requirements engineering 
process [8]. Lamsweerde assessed the relation between requirements options and 
leaves goals in goal graphs to improve decision-making process [9]. Nunes-Vaz, 
Lord, and Ciuk introduced a framework that can be used to relate the security 
measures to the desired security performance [10]. Le Sage, Toubaline, and 
Borrion discussed how security risk scenarios should be formulated [11] to make 
the relation between offender's actions, offender's goals and the system’s anti-
goals more explicit. Other studies have focused on techniques for eliciting, 
analysing and modelling security requirements, and quantitative decision analysis 
including trade-off analysis among requirements [12], categorising and 
prioritising security requirements [13], discussing constraints and satisfaction of 
arguments [14], systematic support for analysing security trade-offs to achieve a 
good-enough security level [15], formal modelling and analysis of security 
requirements [16], and emphasising the role of quantitative assessment in risk 
management [17]. These efforts have provided valuable knowledge to support 
decision-making. However, evaluating the level of goodness of different security 
resolution actions (i.e., alternatives) remains a challenging task. 
This research aims to introduce a modelling language to represent the effects of 
resolution actions on the stakeholders' goals, the crime process, and the attacker - 
the term attacker is used to represent a single offender or a group committing the 
crime. In order to reach this aim, we develop a multidisciplinary security 
decision-making framework that combines existing knowledge from the fields of 
software engineering, crime science, risk assessment, and quantitative decision 
analysis. This framework supports the following activities: 
 identifying the stakeholders, and their security goals using security 
requirements engineering techniques, 
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 characterising the identified attack using the concept of crime scripts  from 
crime science, 
 measuring the identified resolution actions using quantitative decision 
analysis techniques, 
 relating the identified resolution actions to different situations modelled in 
the crime script. The result of this stage improves the decision-makers' 
understanding about the effect of each resolution on the crime process, 
 defining a modelling language that integrates the results of the above stages 
to identify the most cost-effective security resolution. This modelling 
language evaluates the effects of the identified resolution actions on the 
stakeholders' goals, the crime script, and the attacker. 
Section II provides a brief overview of the various components that form the 
framework including techniques for identifying stakeholders and modelling goals, 
risk assessment techniques, and crime scripting techniques. Section III describes 
how these components are integrated together. It comprises the framework that is 
used to generate the conceptual model representing the relation between the main 
entities of a security 
risk problem. Section 
IV illustrates the 
application of the 
framework through a 
case study concerning 
identity theft - a 
significant problem 
that causes 
approximately £52 
billion per annum to 
the UK [18]. Finally 
the article ends with a 
conclusion and future 
work in Section V. 
II. 
BACKGROUND  
Decision-making under uncertainty is a common problem in different disciplines. 
The current research aims to address this problem using an integrated approach 
that involves software engineering, risk assessment, crime scripting, and 
quantitative decision analysis techniques. 
 
 
Figure 1: A partial security goal model for a credit card company 
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A. Software Engineering 
Software engineering (SE) techniques are used to identify stakeholders, their 
goals, and create a modelling language. 
Security Requirements Engineering: in order to evaluate the effects of 
resolution actions on the 
security goals of the 
stakeholders, the goals 
must first be identified. 
For this, security 
requirements engineering 
techniques can be used.  
By security goals and 
requirements, we mean those goals and requirements that relate to the protection 
of the system's assets against malicious behaviours. A necessary condition for a 
system to be secure is that all application-specific security requirements should be 
met by the system [19]. They need to be explicit, precise, adequate, measurable, 
complete, and non-conflicting with other requirements [14, 16, 20]. Using a credit 
card company as an example, a security goal for this company can be avoiding 
unauthorised access to the user's account. 
Goal Modelling: in our approach, we use GORE (Goal-oriented Requirements 
Engineering) to elicit and model stakeholders' goals. Leveraging our experience 
of GORE and SE, we design a modelling language that relates the identified 
resolution actions to the stakeholders' goals and the attack process.  
A goal is an objective the system under consideration should achieve. The benefit 
of goal modelling is to support heuristic, qualitative, or formal reasoning schemes 
during requirements elicitation. GORE is based on multi-view model showing 
how goals, objects, agents, scenarios, operations, and domain properties are inter-
related in the system-as-is and the system-to-be. Goals are prescriptive statements 
of intent whose 
satisfaction requires 
the cooperation of 
agents (or active 
components), in a 
software/system and its 
environment [9, 20-
23]. Figure 1 
demonstrates a partial 
Table I: setting up a credit card using a stolen identity risk's details 
Risk setting up a credit card using a stolen identity 
Possible target the victim's credit 
Description 
One stranger can overtake a person personal details to 
open a credit card account. Then he collects the credit 
card, from the delivery point, and spend the victim's 
credit, which will be debited from him/her [2] 
 
 
Figure 2: A bow-tie diagram for setting up a credit card using a stolen identity 
risk 
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security goal model for a credit card company. 
B. Risk Assessment 
In our framework, which 
is introduced in Section 
III, we use risk 
assessment (RA) 
techniques in providing 
input stage. RA includes 
three activities: Risk 
Identification, Risk 
Analysis, and Risk 
Evaluation [24]. This 
paper uses the first two to identify and describe the security risks that a system 
encounters. 
Risk Identification: risk identification is prerequisite of risk treatment. It 
provides awareness of possible events that could impact negatively on the 
objective(s) of a system/process and the goals of the stakeholders [9, 24]. This 
article focuses on the risks that are identified by the stakeholders. Table I shows 
an identified risk including its description and the target of the attack. 
Risk Analysis: risk analysis aims to identify and characterise the scenarios that 
include the identified risk events. For this, different techniques can be used to 
analyse their causes and consequences, also using concepts of threats and 
vulnerability. More information about risk analysis and the details of different 
activities and mechanism can be found in [24]. The described framework uses 
consequence analysis and crime script; the former is described in continue, and 
the latter is defined in Section II-C. 
Consequence Analysis: in this stage, an analysis is carried out that models the 
possible consequences of the identified risk events [24]. A forward approach is 
used where the risk analysis begins with the identification of initiating events (the 
hazard, the event, or the opportunity). Thereafter, the consequences of the various 
events are analysed to identify relevant events and associated scenarios. Figure 2 
shows a consequence analysis for the following risk event: setting up a credit 
card using a stolen identity risk. As explained in [24], this bow-tie diagram 
represents the initiating event (in the middle), its causes (left), and consequences 
(right). As it can be seen in Figure 2, the main consequence of the mentioned 
event is financial loss. This includes the compensation of the stolen credit and the 
overhead costs. This consequence conflicts with one of the security goals of a 
credit card company, which is protecting user's asset. 
 
TABLE II the D terms that are used in this paper, the complete list of 11 
D techniques can be found in [1] 
Defeat 
“block access and movement or block/obscure the 
information that offenders want to collect” 
Deter-known 
“offenders know what the risk of exposure is, and 
judge it unacceptable so abandon/ abort HR 
attempt” 
Deter-unknown 
offenders are uncertain what control methods they 
are up against, so judge risk of exposure 
unacceptable 
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CRIME SCRIPT 
This article uses 
Cornish’s crime script 
(CS) model to 
represent the attack 
process [25] This 
model is also used to 
describe the effect of 
the identified 
resolution actions, and 
better understand the 
mechanisms activated 
by the resolutions to 
affect the attacker's 
activities. 
“Crime scripts hold 
this innovative capacity of untangling very complex forms of crime by breaking 
down the crime-commission process into different steps” [26]. A CS represents 
the complete sequence of actions adopted prior to, during, and following crime 
commission. The most significant benefit of the crime script concept is that it 
provides a framework to systematically investigate all of the stages of the crime 
commission process of a specific crime and in as much details as existing data 
allow [25-31]. 
CS is used in crime science to improve the understanding about how certain types 
of crime occur. It also offers a way to develop Situational Crime Prevention 
(SCP) techniques, as described in [29, 32].  
There exist different SCP techniques. Ekblom and Hirchfield introduced the 11 
Ds, which refer to high level principles that could be adopted to influence an 
offender's decisions 
[1]. In our framework, 
we use the 11 Ds to 
describe and analyse 
how (and when) a 
resolution action 
affects a particular 
crime script. Table II 
lists the principles that 
are used in this paper, 
 
Figure 3: overview of the proposed framework 
 
Figure 4: calculation of the value of a resolution action 
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borrowing from the SCP terminology. 
In criminology and crime science, CS is mostly used for crime representation and 
resolution action identification [26, 27, 33-38]. Here, we assume that the 
resolution actions have already been identified and we want to assess their effects 
on the crime process. This is carried out by relating the resolutions to the CS, and 
investigate in which situations those resolutions would obstruct the CS.  
III. INTEGRATED RESOLUTION ACTION EFFECT EVALUATION 
FRAMEWORK 
Figure 3 shows the overall picture of our proposed framework. It comprises three 
phases, which are Providing Input, Resolution Actions Effect Evaluation, and 
Decision-making. 
A. Providing Input 
The data required for our evaluation is provided in this phase, using the 
techniques introduced in Section II. As it can be seen in Figure 3 this phase 
includes the following tasks: 
Stakeholders and Goals Identification, where the main stakeholders of the 
system and their goals are identified. The main stakeholders can be the victim, or 
someone for whom the mitigation actions are designed. Although the main focus 
is on the security goals, the related goals and requirements from the entire 
organisation must also be considered, not just system-as-is or system-to-be, as 
mentioned in [16]. The result of this stage is used in Risk Identification and 
Resolutions' Effect Evaluation. 
Risk Identification is described in Section II-B. 
Risk Analysis is described in Sections II-B and II-C. It has two main stages: 
 Consequence Analysis, where the main consequences of the risk are 
identified. The result is used in the next steps to calculate the expected loss 
magnitude, and assess the value of the resolution actions, 
 Crime Script Structuring, where the identified risk and corresponding 
crime script(s) are modelled. 
Resolution Action Identification consists of identifying possible resolutions to 
reduce the identified risk. In this article we assume that resolution actions are 
identified, for instance, by a security consultant or the victim, and that one of 
them must be selected by a decision-maker for implementation.  
Resolution Action Evaluation is a quantitative estimation of the benefits that 
would be obtained by implementing the proposed resolution actions. The value of 
each choice is calculated for a specific period of time. Figure 4 illustrates the 
principle of this calculation, with: 
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 the estimated reduction in expected loss magnitude (EML) caused by 
implementing the action, and 
 the estimated cost of executing the action. 
This formula is applied using the quantitative analyses found in related studies [5, 
6, 24]. In this calculation, we consider the uncertainty about the estimated 
numbers and use a range of values instead of point estimates, where applicable. 
The result indicates whether an action is cost-effective and how much reduction 
the action introduces to the risk magnitude. 
B. RESOLUTION ACTIONS EFFECTS' EVALUATION 
This phase covers the main evaluation applied to the inputs in order to support the 
process of decision-making under uncertainty. Two steps are used to assess the 
effect of the resolution actions on the stakeholders' goals, the crime script, and the 
attacker: 
Assessing the Effect of the Identified Resolution Actions on the Crime Script: 
in this step we investigate in which situations the crime process is obstructed by 
the resolution actions. This evaluation provides a picture of how risk is mitigated 
by the resolution actions. This improves the decision-makers' understanding of 
the effect(s) of the 
resolution actions 
on the crime script 
and the attacker. 
We use this result 
in the conceptual 
model, which is 
explained later. 
Modelling the 
effect of the 
Identified 
Resolution Actions 
on the 
Stakeholders' 
Goals, the Crime 
Script, and the 
Attacker: this step 
provides an overall 
picture of the 
relations between 
the identified 
resolution actions 
 
Figure 5: overall picture of the relation between a resolution action and 
its related entities in our proposed framework 
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and the entities they affect. These entities include the victim, the victim's goals, 
the offender, the offender's goals, the attack, and the attack's crime script. Figure 
5 illustrates an overall picture of the relationships between the resolution actions 
and the aforementioned entities. It also shows the scope of our model, which 
covers the resolution actions, the stakeholders' goals, the crime script, and the 
attacker.  
Figure 5 is designed using the modelling techniques from software engineering.  
This overall model shows how the main elements of the framework relate to each 
other. The elements that are located within the scope of our modelling language 
are: 
 the victim's goals, which are the victims security goals. The satisfaction level 
of these goals has to be improved by implementing the resolution actions, 
 the attacker whose actions threaten satisfaction of the victim's security goals, 
 the resolution that are identified by the victim to mitigate the current risk or 
to obstruct the crime script, and 
 the crime script that shows the sequence of actions taken by the attacker. 
C. Decision-making 
In this phase, decision-makers use the gained results to decide which resolution 
action should be implemented. The outputs of the framework is expected to 
improve decision-makers' understanding of: 
 situations/steps in which each resolution action obstructs the crime script, 
 how each resolution action contributes to satisfy the stakeholder's security 
goals, 
 whether all resolution actions introduce the same (negative or positive) effect 
on different goals, 
 the effect of each resolution action is on the attacker. 
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
In this section, we demonstrate the applicability of our framework using a case of 
identity theft1. 
Case Study: Setting up a Credit Card using a Stolen Identity 
The selected case study is 
an identity theft risk 
against credit card 
companies and their 
customers, which was 
described in Table I. The above framework is applied to a couple of resolutions 
                                                 
1 The full case study is available at http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucabdeh/BIT.htm 
TABLE III: the value of the identified resolution actions 
 
 Resolution 1 Resolution 2 
value ~-3.10-2 ~6.10-2 
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that are considered to tackle this crime. The framework allows the effects of the 
alternatives to be evaluated on the victim's goals and the crime process.  
A. Providing Input 
The data needed for the evaluation is provided in this phase, as shown in Figure 3:  
The main stakeholder is the credit card company. It identifies and implements 
the resolution actions, 
The stakeholder's related goals are shown in Figure 1. We also consider 
Maximising Profit as an overall goal of the company, 
The identified risk is stated in Table I, 
The risk's consequences are represented in Figure 2, 
The crime script is detailed in Table IV, 
Resolution Action Identification generates two alternatives: 
 Authenticating the Customers in a Bank Branch: a new released credit card 
can only be used after activation in a branch by the credit card holders, 
 Authenticating the Customers using their Online Banking Account: this 
resolution requires the credit card holders to activate their credit card using 
an existing online banking account – with the name of the credit card holder.  
Resolution Action Evaluation provides information about the gain obtained by 
implementing the different resolutions. Table III provides a summary of the 
hypothetical results that could be obtained by applying the formula in Figure 4. In 
this document, we show the result of the Providing Input phase; the complete case 
study is available online1. 
B. Resolution Actions' Effect Evaluation 
The framework is applied to assess the effects of each resolution on the crime 
script. The results from all the previous stages are then used to draw a conceptual 
model that shows the effects of every solution on the stakeholder's goals, the 
attacker, and the attack process. 
Assessing the Effect of the Identified Resolution Actions on the Crime Script: 
Table 4 illustrates how the identified resolution actions can affect the crime script: 
 the first resolution action hardens the attack process and obstructs the crime 
script in two steps:  
o in the precondition step, an informed offender would not select a credit 
card from a company that will request to prove their identity. This 
obstruction is based on the Deter-known principle, as described in Table 
2, and would work if offenders are aware of it.  
o in the doing step, when the offender wants to activate the credit card, they 
would be required to prove their identity. This obstruction is based on a 
Defeat principle, and prevent them to activate the credit card. 
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 the second resolution action hardens the attack process in two steps. In both 
the steps, the effects are same as the previous resolution. However, the 
chance of success of this resolution is estimated to be smaller than the 
previous resolution. This is because providing access to the victim's online 
bank credentials is more likely than proving the identity in person. 
Modelling the Effect of the Identified Resolution Actions on the 
Stakeholder's Goals and the Attack: Figure 6 shows the effect of the identified 
resolution actions on the stakeholder's goal, the crime script, and the offender. In 
the following, we clarify how this model improves the decision-makers' 
understanding of the effects that the resolutions have on the credit card company's 
goals, the crime script, and the offender. 
C. DECISION-MAKING 
The conceptual model in Figure 6 shows that the first resolution: 
 does not have same behaviour toward all the goals, 
TABLE IV: credit card identity theft's crime script and the effect of the resolution actions on that  
(X: no effect) 
 
CRIME SCRIPT RESOLUTION’S EFFECT 
SCRIPT 
SCENE/FUNCTION 
SCRIPT ACTION RESOLUTION ACTION 
authentication in a 
bank branch 
authentication using 
an online bank 
account 
PRE-CONDITION selecting the victim X X 
collecting the victim's 
personal details 
X X 
selecting a credit card 
company 
Deter-known Deter-known 
placing the order X X 
waiting for the delivery X X 
checking the delivery 
address to collect the card 
X X 
collecting the card X X 
activating the card Defeat Defeat 
DOING using the card's credit X X 
POST-CONDITION destroying the card X X 
vanishing other traces X X 
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 contributes in satisfying the authentication goal, 
 has negative affect against the availability goal, 
 has negative affect against the goal maximising profit (as its value is a 
negative number), 
 obstructs the crime script in two steps, 
 reduces the risk probability and can prevent the attack in 99.9% of the cases. 
It also shows the second resolution has almost same effect as the first one but it: 
 prevents the attack in only 90% of the cases in this instance, 
 contributes in satisfying the goal maximising profit (as its value is a  positive 
number). 
These results show that while both the identified resolutions have almost same 
behaviour towards the crime script and the attacker, the second resolution action 
offers more contributions in the goals' satisfaction. Both the resolutions contribute 
to the satisfaction of the Goal authentication, and both have negative affect on the 
Goal availability. However, the second resolution contributes to satisfy the Goal 
maximising profit while the first one does not. This means the overall positive 
effects of the second resolution on the stakeholder's goals, crime script, and the 
attacker overweigh the effects of the first resolution on those entities. So, the 
second option appears a better decision compared to the first one. 
 
D. RESULTS 
 
Figure 4: the effect of the resolution actions on the stakeholder's goals, the offender, and the crime script for the 
credit identity theft 
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 We have applied the above framework to a case of identity theft in order to 
illustrate how it can support security decision-making under uncertainty. In this 
example, we investigated: 
 how the identified resolutions affect the crime script, 
 how they affect the stakeholder's goals, 
 how they affect the attacker. 
The conceptual model represented in Figure 4 provides an overall picture of the 
effects that each resolution action is expected to have on the CS, stakeholder's 
goals, and the attacker. This helps decision-makers to gain a better understanding 
of the consequences of the different decision choices, and adopt a cost-benefit 
perspective to address a security problem. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The focus of this article was on facilitating assessment of decision options in 
security problems. The output of the proposed framework is a conceptual model 
that aims to clearly represent the effects of each resolution action on the 
stakeholders' goals, the crime script, and the attacker. By using this conceptual 
model, decision makers are expected to gain a better understanding about the 
outcome(s) of their decision(s) and make decisions that result in quality 
improvement. We have demonstrated the framework by applying it on cases of 
identity theft discussed in Section IV. 
In the future, application on more complex industrial case studies would be 
required to better evaluate the applicability of this framework, and refine it. The 
decision-making phase, which is shown in Figure 3, is another area of 
improvement. Investigating factors influencing the decision-making process 
would help improve the framework. In addition, we consider providing a 
validation technique that assesses the quality of crime scripts. 
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